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Abstract
How and why do agglomerations emerge? While economic historians emphasize trade and eco-
nomic geographers emphasize variety, we still do not understand the role of coordination. I fill this
gap by creating a pure-exchange location coordination game and then testing the model in a labora-
tory experiment. Although there is a huge strategy space and multiple equilibria, the model predicts
that marketplaces can emerge as a resilient solution to a highly complex problem of coordinating a
multi-coincidence of wants and locations. In the experiment, I find individuals tend to coalesce purely
to coordinate exchange, that individuals re-agglomerate at the same locations, and that these location
choices aggregate to create a Zipf population distribution. I also test two agglomeration mechanisms
by exogenously varying the number of different goods in the economy and whether traders resi-
dences are land-tied or not. I find that there is more agglomeration in economies with a larger variety
of goods, that being land-tied reduces agglomeration, and that being land-tied magnifies the effect of
variety.
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Smiths, carpenters, wheelwrights, and ploughwrights, masons, and bricklayers, tanners,
shoemakers, and tailors are people whose service the farmer has frequent occasion for.
Such artificers, too, stand occasionally in need of the assistance of one another; and as
their residence is not, like that of the farmer, necessarily tied down to a precise spot, they
naturally settle in the neighbourhood of one another, and thus form a small town or village...
The town is a continual fair or market, to which the inhabitants of the country resort in order
to exchange...
- Adam Smith Wealth of Nations, Book III
1 Introduction
Cities and marketplaces are central to economic development, but our understanding of how they form
and what functions they perform is still very partial. While many scholars of early cities emphasize the
role of trade, it is difficult to empirically establish causality.1 On the other hand, scholars of agglomera-
tion who use satellite evidence from the modern era are divided on the importance of trade: Henderson et
al. (2018) argues agriculture is the fundamental force, while Desmet, Nagy, and Rossi-Hansberg (2018)
argue for an important interaction between trade with migration. But since we lack data allowing identi-
fication of the micro-mechanisms (Combes, Duranton, and Gobillon 2011; Gibbons and Overman 2012),
I use the experimental method to generate agglomerations from individual choices. But to test the mech-
anisms in the lab, I first modify the standard model of agglomeration.
I develop a pure-exchange location-coordination game, based on historical narratives and Smith’s (1776)
theory of agglomeration. In the model, geographically dispersed individuals want to get together to ob-
tain a variety of goods from others but incur costs of doing so. I formalize this by extending the model
of Fudenberg and Ellison (2003) and Anderson, Ellison, and Fudenberg (2010) to have multiple indi-
viduals trading multiple goods at multiple locations. Although the game has a huge strategy space, it
allows me to focus on the effects of trading new goods (emphasized by Christaller 1933; Boulding 1964;
Romer 1994). It does so by separating preference parameters from the fixed costs of production, which
Neary (2001) argued are confounded in the standard model. The model also allows me to separate the
effect of residences being land-tied, also noted by Krugman (1991) of agriculture, from other factors like
constant-returns technologies and transportation costs. In my game, agglomerations can only emerge
through individuals’ desires to spatially coordinate exchange and not from typical factors like externali-
ties, increasing returns, or imperfect competition.2
This setup provides testable hypothesis about how and why agglomerations emerge. Although the game
has multiple equilibria, when individuals agglomerate they still reap the gains from trade when others
stochastically deviate or the environment changes, and this means evolutionary forces should select for
them. Furthermore, agglomerations serve as focal points in this coordination game, which suggests that
agglomerations will re-emerge at the same location after shocks. The game also allows me to isolate
and analyze two of the central forces in agglomeration formation: the variety of goods obtained from
1See Appendix A.1 for a review of this historical literature.
2For example, the 2009 World Bank Development describes New York and Paris in this way. There is a vast literature
that builds on the model developed by Krugman (1991), with origins in Marshall (1920), on the emergence of cities based on
attributes of production (Krugman 1996; Fujita, Krugman, and Venables 2001; Tabuchi and Thisse 2011; Fujita and Thisse
2013a; De Palma and Papageorgiou 2017).
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exchange and whether or not individuals are tied to the land. Although there are multiple equilibria,
I predict that increasing the variety of goods in the economy creates larger gains from trade and more
agglomeration. I also argue that releasing individuals from the land should increase agglomeration, but
this changes the game into a dynamic problem that is too complex to explicitly solve for all equilibria. So
because of the multiple equilibria, as well as the complicated comparative statics, I test the implications
of my model with a laboratory experiment.
I perform a laboratory experiment that generates multiple realizations of the entire agglomerating pro-
cess, and this creates clear counterfactuals from weak econometric assumptions. Specifically, I initially
distribute individuals evenly over a featureless rectangular grid and then observe how the geographic dis-
tribution of individuals evolves from period to period as individuals change locations to trade.3 Different
treatments test the variety and land-tied mechanisms by exogenously varying the number of different
goods in the economy and whether traders are land-tied or not. My experiment builds on Kimbrough,
Smith, and Wilson (2008), Kimbrough and Wilson (2011), and Banerjee, Kwasnica, and Shortle (2012)
and it allows me to clearly identify agglomeration when it occurs and to isolate the causal mechanisms.
The results show that geographically dispersed traders spontaneously coalesce to reap the gains from
trade. A marketplace emerges in both senses of the word ‘geographic coordinate’: a physical point on
a map and a focal point coordinating traders. While central marketplaces are not the equilibria with
the highest average payoffs (as often emphasized in theory), groups that form central marketplaces in
the experiment obtain higher payoffs than those that do not. Furthermore, the results of the different
treatments also show that there is more agglomeration in economies with a larger variety of goods,
being land-tied reduces agglomeration, but being land-tied magnifies the effect of variety. Finally, I
show the sum of individual location choices aggregate to create a Zipf population distribution, which
shows coordinated-exchange is a consistent explanation for both the historical narrative and the macro
statistics. As a whole, these experiments reinforce Smith’s narrative of agglomeration and furthers our
understanding of the mechanisms.
2 Theory
I examine a two-stage location coordination game where individuals make location choices in the first
stage choice based on the benefits from trade in the second stage. In the model of Fudenberg and Ellison
(2003), a large number of buyers and sellers simultaneously choose one of two locations in the first stage
based on second stage payoffs (which are general to any second stage game). In the first stage of my
game, a smaller number of individuals simultaneously choose where to locate on a two dimensional grid
and which good to bring. Trading multiple goods is an especially important innovation that highlights
the role of variety in motivating exchange - a point I make concretely by assuming Constant Elasticity
of Substitution (CES) preferences.4 In the second stage of my game, individuals trade their good with
other individuals at the same location under competitive-market conditions. To calculate the equilibria, I
first solve for the second stage consumption payoffs after good and location decisions have been made,
and then endogenize the decisions of where to bring which goods.
3As such, I create a virtual petri dish to observe agglomeration. This mimics the setup of Christaller (1933), who modelled
central places emerging on a blank slate, and complements modern geocell analysis.
4Note CES preferences mean any new goods are equally complementary to any goods already being consumed.
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2.1 Stage 2, Pure Exchange
Each individual i maximizes an identical CES utility function subject to a budget constraint Mi to obtain
a payoff of U2i (superscript denotes the stage). Let Xi,g represent the quantity that i consumes of good g,
Pg as the price, n as the number of goods, and ρ ∈ (0,1] as the substitute/complements parameter. Where
max
Xi,1,...,Xi,g
U2i =
[
n
∑
g=1
Xρi,g
]1/ρ
s.t. Mi =
n
∑
g=1
PgXi,g
yields individual consumption and payoffs
X∗i,g = MiP
1
ρ−1
g
/
∑
g′
P
ρ
ρ−1
g′ (1)
U2i = Mi
[
n
∑
g=1
P
ρ
ρ−1
g
] 1−ρ
ρ
In a pure-endowment economy, there is a fixed total quantity Ωg of each good g. Under competitive-
equilibrium conditionsΩg =∑i X∗i,g imply the price ratio for goods g and g′ is
(
Pg/Pg′
) 1
ρ−1 =Ωg/Ωg′ . An
individual endowed with a quantity Ωg of good g′ earns an income Mi = Pg′Ωg′ which leads to a payoff
U2i = Ωg′
[
n
∑
g=1
(
Ωg
Ωg′
)ρ] 1−ρρ
(2)
2.2 Stage 1, Coordinating Who brings What Where
Each individual i is has a home location i on a grid S = {(x1,y1), ...,(xL,yL)}. In the baseline model,
this home location is fixed. Individuals choose to bring an endowment Ωi ∈ {Ω1, ...,Ωn} to a location
`i ∈ S to earn payoffs according to equation 2. But individuals lose part of their endowment when they
move; i.e person i has a transportation cost c( i, `i) to move from his current location i to location `i.
Since all endowments that are lost in getting to a location affect the equilibrium exchange rates, equation
2 refers to endowments net-of-transportation costs. Formally, denote Ωg(`i)− cg(`i) as the sum amount
of Ωg at `i that remains after individuals lost a total of cg(`i) along the way. Thus the utility achieved by
individual i in the first stage from choosing to bring Ωi to `i is
U1i (`i,Ωi) = [Ωi− c( i, `i)]
[
n
∑
g=1
(
Ωg(`i)− cg(`i)
Ωi(`i)− ci(`i)
)ρ] 1−ρρ
(3)
Equation 3 creates the following four points of intuition. 1) If I bring more of a good then my payoffs
will be higher. 2) If others bring more of the same good as me then my payoffs will be lower. 3) If others
bring a larger variety of different goods then my payoff will be higher. 4) The exact magnitude of these
relations depends on the complementarity of the goods, i.e. there is no gain in agglomerating to obtain
perfect substitutes.5 So individuals are coordinating locations and anti-coordinating goods. But equation
5Two dimensions were chosen rather than one because one dimensional models often have results that do not generalize
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3 also shows each individual’s payoffs are highly contingent on the environment: everyones locations,
costs, endowments, and preferences. This means I have to focus on one specific game because too many
computations are required to explore multiple environments. A game with n goods, L locations, and I
individuals creates a strategy space of (n×L)I different choice combinations to evaluate in finding all
of the pure-strategy equilibria for each environment. So I focus on the smallest number of goods that
allow for comparative statics on variety and the maximum number of individuals and locations that were
computationally feasible to analyze.
There are I = 6 individuals with identical CES(ρ = .5) utility functions on a 5×3 grid of locations. There
is a 2 unit Manhattan distance cost for moving from home to destination locations - i.e. an individual
with i = (x1,y1) locating at `i = (x2,y2) incurs cost c( i, `i) = 2(|x1− x2|+ |y1− y2|). Each individual
is endowed with 12 units of whatever good they choose and they can move to any location on the grid.
Figure 1 shows the initial locations with of arbitrary endowments. The left subfigure shows the game
when each individual can choose from {12 ,12 } and the right subfigure shows the game when each
individual can choose from {12 ,12 ,12 }.
Figure 1: Initial Spatial Distributions
I numerically compute all of the pure-strategy Nash-equilibria for this game. My computations show
there are a large number of equilibria, but many are similar (isomorphic). So I adopt the “Boltzmann
Principle” from statistical entropy and measure microstates, macrostates, and the number of microstates
per macrostate. Here, “microstates” are equilibria describing exactly who does what where, and a
“macrostate” describes multiple microstates that are the same along many dimensions (i.e. isomorphic
equilibria). Specifically, a macrostate describes the number of locations covered and the number of in-
dividuals who bring each good. For example, consider the macrostate where 3 individuals bring and 3
individuals bring to a single location. This macrostate is consistent with individuals 1,2,3 bringing
and individuals 4,5,6 bringing to location a. But this macrostate is also consistent with the microstate
where those individuals bring those goods to another location b, and the multiple microstates where dif-
ferent individuals are bringing those goods. While analyzing macrostates instead of microstates discards
information, it could potentially simplify the analysis a great deal. Table 1 summarizes that game with
the number of potential microstates (the strategy space), the number of microstates and the mean number
of microstates per macrostate.
(see Irmen and Thisse 1998 for example).
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Table 1: Game Summary
Strategy Space # Microstates # Microstates / Macrostate
2 Goods 729000000 3784 252
3 Goods 8303765625 6498 224
I formally define a “central marketplace” as the macrostate where all traders are located at the same loca-
tion. This macrostate differs from the many other macrostates where trade is decentralized. For example,
the payoff maximizing macrostate has many microstates where the closest individuals each bring one of
the goods (i.e. three pairs in the 2 good environment or two triples in the 3 good environment). But
although the central marketplace has very few microstates (i.e. is low-entropy), I show why evolutionary
forces might select for it.
2.3 Equilibria Payoffs and Resilience
I show how central marketplaces emerge to allow traders to be coordinated in a very complex environ-
ment. I do this by merging evolutionary economic geography (Martin and Sunley 2007; Boschma and
Martin 2010; Martin and Sunley 2012; Kogler 2015; Boschma and Frenken 2018) with the evolutionary
game theory. In particular, I build on (Crawford and Haller 1990; Crawford 1991; Ellison 2000) by using
the size of the basin of attraction as an equilibrium selection criterion. In particular, I use a notion of
global (rather than local) stability which illustrates how “resilient” central marketplaces are.
I say an equilibrium is resilient if no individual wants to deviate from equilibrium under the belief that
other individuals are deviating with large probability. These beliefs about deviations can be real (when
other individuals use a mixed strategy) or imaginary (when others are simply assumed to have a trembling
hand). The important point is that when an individual believes others make choices stochastically, some
equilibria will be eliminated due to the lower expected payoffs that stem from the risk of miscoordination.
I show how resilient each equilibrium is by numerically computing expected utilities for different devia-
tion magnitudes and eliminate equilibria from the pool when any individual is no-longer best responding.
Formally, the expected utility for an individual i is
E
[
U1i (`i,Ωi) |
{
(σΩ,−i+ εσ ,−i,σ`,−i+ εΩ,−i)
}
−i
]
(4)
where (σΩ,−i,σ`,−i) are vectors that specify the probability of individual −i choosing the equilibrium
(Ω−i, `−i), and (εΩ,−i,ε`,−i) are vectors that specify the probability of deviating from equilibrium.6 In
my computations, I scale the deviations from equilibrium to be in percentage terms so that a single pa-
rameter e ∈ [0,1] is used to calculate the degree of strategic resilience. Specifically, for L locations, there
is 1− e(L−1)/L probability of choosing the equilibrium location and e/L probability of choosing each
other location. Likewise, for n goods, there is 1− e(n− 1)/n probability of choosing the equilibrium
endowment and e/n probability of choosing each other endowment. So e = 0 specifies the pure strategy
6I use numerical computations to estimate expected utility. Specifically, I take the average of 1000 utility calculations for
each individual i, where each calculation draws Ω−i ∼Multinoulli(σΩ,−i+ εΩ,−i) and `−i ∼Multinoulli(σ`,−i+ ε`,−i) ∀− i.
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equilibrium and e = 1 specifies all actions are choosen with equal probability.
Figure 2 summarizes the distribution of average payoffs and strategic resilience for each equilibrium.
The histograms show the marginal distributions of all microstate equilibria, and the scatterplot shows
the averages for each macrostate. Most macrostates are on the left-side of the plot and are not resilient,
including the payoff maximizing macrostate. This is because if you still show up at the right place with
the right good and the other one or two players go to the wrong location or bring the wrong good, then
you end up with a low payoff. On the other hand, central marketplaces are the most resilient macrostate.
They are the bottom-most right-most macrostate in each plot, showing lower payoffs under strategic
certainty but remain mutual best-responses under large deviations. This is because if you show up at
the right place with the right good, you still earn a high payoff unless a large number of individuals go
elsewhere or systematically bring the wrong goods.
Figure 2: Equilibrium Payoffs and Strategic Resilience
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(b) 3 Goods
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*scatterplots show macrostate averages, histograms show microstate marginal distributions
I use stochastic evolutionary game theory for equilibrium selection. If strategies are made stochastically,
then an equilibrium with a larger basin of attraction is more likely to catch strategic mutations and a
population is more likely to evolve towards it (Sandholm 2010). Since more resilient equilibria have a
larger basin of attraction they are more likely to be selected. Thus the theory predicts
Hypothesis 1: Central marketplaces are more likely to emerge.
In particular, a central marketplace at the central cell is the most resilient.7 But I also show, using the
theory of focal points (Schelling 2006; Mehta, Starmer, and Sugden 1994; Kramarz 1996; Isoni et al.
2013) to explain why agglomerations re-emerge at the same locations after shocks, even if not at the
most resilient equilibrium. Building on the formal definition of dynamic focal points by Casajus (2001),
central marketplaces are equilibria that are more likely to arise through the history of play and frame any
7This is because at least one individual at a corner of the grid will recieve lower payoffs if the agglomeration was
elsewhere.
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stage-game currently being played. That historical frame should create a tendency towards agglomerat-
ing at the same locations, even after being physically reset. This prediction is noteworthy because it is
well documented that cities are resilient, by Davis and Weinstein (2002) for example, but ‘memory’ is
not predicted by the standard model (Martin and Sunley 2012).8 Thus the second hypotheses generated is
Hypothesis 2: Once emerged, a central marketplace will re-emerge at the same location after shocks.
There is a theoretical cost associate with this resilience, as welfare is given up in comparison to other
states under strategic certainty. But this cost declines with the number of goods because payoffs at the
central marketplace increase with the number of goods. This is because more new goods⇒ more gains
from trade⇒ more benefits to agglomerating.
2.4 The Effect of New Goods
The variety of goods affects how steep the incentives are to agglomerate. Since there are still a large
number of macrostates, I isolate and analyze the phenomena of interest: the incentives for a dispersed
population of traders to coalesce towards a single agglomeration. The intuition for this argument is
found by comparing an individuals’ utility alone (consuming their endowment) to an individuals utility
at the central agglomeration (trading for smaller amounts of more different goods). While the CES
case is shown in Appendix Section A.2, the following illustration, where individuals always trade for an
equal amount of the other goods available, makes the point. In a world with 3 goods, the incentive to
agglomerate is
U(1/3,1/3,1/3)−U(1,0,0) (5)
In a world with 2 goods, the incentive to agglomerate is
U(1/2,1/2,0)−U(1,0,0) (6)
and the change in the agglomeration incentive is
U(1/3,1/3,1/3)−U(1/2,1/2,0) (7)
The incentive to agglomerate is ∆U/∆n because when there are more new goods to be traded, there are
more gains at a central marketplace. The CES complements parameter is also important because when
the goods are more complementary the locations are more strategic-complementary. This also incen-
tivizes agglomeration because the extensive-marginal utility is larger. But Smith (1776) did not empha-
size preferences, he emphasized a large variety of agglomerators: Smiths, carpenters, wheelwrights, and
ploughwrights, masons, and bricklayers, tanners, shoemakers, and tailors. For a large set of unobserv-
able preferences, the incentive to agglomerate is determined by an observable number of new goods that
can be obtained at a central marketplace. Figure 2 shows that new goods make coordination more desire-
able, with bigger increases for central marketplaces. Table 2 shows that distribution of microstates also
changes, with more of the microstates describing individuals choosing to be less disperesed over different
locations. The gains from trade shift the distribution of equilibria to be more spatially concentrated.
8Resilience is different than persistence, which is also predicted by model and much of the literature (i.e. Litina 2016;
Allen and Donaldson 2018). Resilience results because coordinated agglomerations are stable for reasons that are assumed
away in competitive agglomerations - i.e. individuals not being indifferent across space (Glaeser 2007) or having exogenously
fixed locations (Hotelling 1929).
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Table 2: Number of Microstates by Spatial Coverage
2 Goods 3 Goods
1 Locations Covered 12 342
2 Locations Covered 580 5724
3 Locations Covered 3160 432
4 Locations Covered 32 0
A larger number of goods in the economy also leads to a larger strategy space, a larger number of equi-
libria, and possibly more strategic uncertainty. Figure 2 shows that the central marketplace for 3 goods
is less resilient in absolute value compared to the central marketplace for 2 goods. However, compared
to distribution of other equilibria in a given environment, the central marketplace is more of a resilience
outlier with the 3 goods compared to the 2 goods. In accordance with Hypothesis 1, this relative increase
in resilience would further incentivize central marketplaces. Thus variety both increases the payoffs from
agglomerating and increases the evolutionary pressure towards central marketplaces.9 This leads to the
following prediction
Hypothesis 3: A larger variety of goods in the economy will lead to more agglomeration.
2.5 Individuals Not Land-Tied
In the baseline case discussed in the theory so far, individuals have home locations that are tied to a
particular location and must choose where to locate and what to bring for trade. While this is a feature of
many agricultural communities, many people are not farmers tied to the land. And since the predictions
are derived based on the gains from trade, Hypothesis 3 is plausibly general to settings where individuals
are not land-tied. But being land tied could also have it’s own direct effect. When individuals are not
land-tied the game becomes dynamic and creates two major differences. First, the cost of movement
decreases so the game becomes less analogous to a battle of the sexes game and more analogous to a
pure-coordination game. Second, there is a much larger strategy space and more strategic uncertainty.
Based on the theoretical principles I’ve stated in Sections 2.4 and 2.3, this should lead to more agglom-
eration. The central marketplace could be more likely to emerge because it is resilient to changes in the
home-locations of traders, and the benefits from going there are larger.10 Smith (1776) states that when
their residence is not, like that of the farmer, necessarily tied down to a precise spot, they naturally settle
in the neighbourhood of one another. But since the strategy space is too large to compute additional
residence choices, the following hypotheses are stated without explicit derivation.
Hypothesis 3 (Strong Form): A larger variety of goods in the economy will lead to more agglomeration,
even when individuals are not land-tied.
Hypothesis 4: Not being land-tied will lead to more agglomeration.
According to Smith (1776): the town is a continual fair or market resulting from the accumulation of
a variety of traders who are not land-tied. In my game, trade alone is sufficient for agglomeration and
9An extreme example of the phenomena is when there are as many goods as players: then the central marketplace would
have higher payoffs, a larger strategy space, a relatively higher number of microstates.
10While not being land-tied reduces the direct cost of agglomerating at the central marketplace, it does so for other
equilibria as well. Lower costs can differentially increase payoffs at the central marketplace and increase the steepness of the
basin of attraction.
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I have ruled out other mechanisms by design. But the game has multiple equilibria, so it is not entirely
deterministic in its predictions and provides only probabilistic claims about a small set of equilibria
being selected. I also isolate the effects of variety and land-tied on agglomeration, but whether or not my
hypotheses hold is an empirical question, so I perform a laboratory experiment.
3 Experimental Design
I design a laboratory experiment to test the model described in the theory section. In the experiment,
6 participants are assigned an initial location and 12 units of a particular good as shown in Figure 1.
Participants only make the location and good choices for the first stage of the game, with the computer
automatically computing the second stage equilibrium based on choices in the first stage. Specifically,
each individual simultaneously chooses to bring one good to one location and then a Walrasian equilib-
rium is computed based on the number and variety of goods brought to that location. Each participants
makes these choices for 32 periods, having their endowments reset before they begin the next period.
Participants’ home locations are also reset in some sessions but update to the last location chosen in
other sessions.
3.1 Treatments
Twelve experimental sessions were conducted two at a time within the same room. I started one of the
parallel sessions with 2 goods and the other with 3 goods. After half of the periods have completed,
the locations are reset and the number of goods changes, either increasing from 2→ 3 or decreasing
from 3→ 2 depending on the initial treatment in the session. I refer to the periods before the switch as
occuring under the first time block and the periods after as occuring under the second time block. The
first six parallel sessions treated home locations as not land-tied t+1 = `t , while the next six parallel
sessions treated homes as land-tied, t+1 = 0. The entire design is shown in Table 3. There are two
land-tied blocks (land-tied, not), each with six sessions where the number of goods goes from 2→ 3 and
six sessions goes from 3→ 2 and each session having six individuals.
Table 3: Experimental Design: Sessions × Individuals
# Goods
2→ 3 3→ 2
Land-Tied 6×6 6×6
Not Land-Tied 6×6 6×6
3.2 Hypotheses
All sessions are used to test the first and second hypotheses that individuals agglomerate to reap the gains
from trade and that once formed they will re-emerge after shocks. The resetting of locations and different
number of goods at the halfway point provides the shock. There is also within session and across session
variation in the number of goods, providing a clear test of the strong and weak forms of third hypothesis
that variety incentivizes agglomeration. The experiment also provides an across-session test on the effect
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of being land-tied. While this was important to Smith (1776) it was not precisely pinned down by my
theory, so the experiment provides much insight into the land-tied effect.
3.3 Procedure
The experiment took place at Chapman University in April 2018. The experimental participants were
undergraduate students who sat in 2 rows of individual cubicles connected to my repurposed R+Shiny
software hosted on Amazon Web Server. For each session, I recruited 12 subjects to the lab at random
from the subject pool of the Economic Science Institute Laboratory at Chapman University. No sub-
ject had any experience in a prior spatial coordination experiment, and no subject participated in our
experiment more than once. Each session lasted 1 hour and subjects earned $18 on average based on
the lab-standard $7 show up fee plus two random periods earnings.11 Individuals were not allowed to
communicate with one another but every individual had an identical summary map that displays the
location of all goods and average payoffs in the previous period. Each individual also had a private in-
formation tab that displays their individual history and a set of sliders to help simulate counterfactuals.
Before beginning the experiment, the subjects received paper copies of the instructions. The interface
and instructions are shown in Appendix Figure B.1. I first orally presented the instructions to the subjects
alongside a tutorial period before a self-paced practice period. The experiment began when no subjects
had additional questions. The subjects then made choices for 16 periods, after which I announced the
number of goods had changed and locations were reset. The subjects then made choices for another 16
periods.
3.4 Identifying Agglomeration
My experiment rules out other factors that cause agglomeration by design, but the experiment also allows
me to cleanly identify agglomeration. I am able to address three important measurement issues in the
empirical literature: 1) the modifiable unit area problem - at what spatial scale to measure agglomeration
2) the definition problem - how to empirically calculate agglomeration 3) the Greenland problem - how
do the calculations depend on the curvature of the earth. I discuss how my experiment addresses each of
these issues in turn.
For the modifiable unit area problem, scholars either perform the same analysis at different scales or
aggregates data to large pixels which presumably “internalizes agglomeration externalities” (Henderson
et al. 2018). Although there often remains some uncertainty about what the right scale is, I can analyze
location choices at the smallest scale but also aggregate data to the level that exactly captures the relevant
area for agglomeration. But even without the modifiable unit area problem, the question still remains as
to how to empirically calculate agglomeration.
While there are different many different ways to calculate agglomeration (Kominers 2008), a common
class of definitions are built around population levels or densities. This can be problematic because many
of those measures do not capture how those densities change over space but instead capture other factors
like population growth.12 In my experiment, there is no variation in the population levels, so factors like
11Each individual was payed at the end of the experiment based on one U2i selected for each of the two within-session
treatments that were converted to dollars at an exchange rate of $1/4.
12A good example of the difference is illustrated by seperately comparing three populations along a line. The first popu-
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population growth will not be affecting any of my measurements. But to address the definition issue,
I will perform mutliple analyses, including visualizing the raw population distributions and regression
analysis using an aggregate index of population concentration. But even when using the right measure at
the right scale, the Greenland problem would still exist.
The Greenland problem refers to the misrepresentation of sizes on maps that are not equal-area projec-
tions (i.e. how Greenland appears to be the size of Africa when using the Mercator projection). For
certain questions this is not a major statistical issue, but is crucial for measuring agglomeration. For
example, using different sized bins to count up and compare a population uniformly distributed along
a continuum will create a systematic bias towards finding higher counts in larger sized bins. While it
is not known how the Greenland problem, the definition problem, and the modifiable unit area prob-
lem all interact to affect the measurement of agglomeration, I am able to rule out all of these issues.13
Furthermore, by evenly distributing the initial population, agglomeration will be easy to identify from
visualizations before constructing any metrics.
4 Empirics
4.1 Choices of Locations
The results of the experiment are summarized in Figure 3. The top figure shows variation over time
while the bottom figures show variation over space. In particular, Panel A shows the average number of
people per populated cell within each treatment over time. The bottom left figure (Panel B) shows the
average population distribution over Periods 13,14,15,16 for each session (grouped by treatment), with
larger populations having darker colors. The bottom right figure (Panel C) shows the average population
distribution over Periods 29,30,31,32 for the same sessions under the different treatments. For example,
the session on the top left of the ‘Land-Tied, 2 Goods’ treatment has about 3 individuals at the cell in
the 1st-row 3rd-column, 2 individuals at the cell in the 2nd-row 1st-column, and less than that at other
locations, on average over periods 13-16. Over periods 29-32, that same session is shown in the top
left of the ‘Land-Tied, 3 Goods’ treatment, and has about 5 individuals in the 3rd-row 3rd-column and
1 individual or less at other locations on average. A time-series of maps for all sessions is shown in
Appendix Figures 6 and 7.
Figure 3 suggests a number of important findings. First, Panels B and C provide evidence for the geo-
graphical notion of “place and space”. First and foremost, individuals form central marketplaces in sup-
port of Hypothesis 1. Looking at Periods 13-16 and Periods 29-32, the proportion of sessions that had a
spatial coverage of only 1 cell was 1/3. This is far more than predicted by the distribution of microstates
in Table 2 or that the six individuals agglomerated at any of the cells by pure chance, ∑15(1/15)6. But
individuals also return to the “place” (the cell where everyone was trading) not the “space” (everywhere
lation is normally distributed along a line; the second population is also normally distributed along the long but with a larger
population at every point, and the third population is normally distributed along a line but with a larger variance than the first.
When comparing the second and third populations to the first, only the second is oviously less agglomerated.
13For example, my empirics contrast with the R2 measure used by Henderson et al. (2018). The comparison of OLS
regresssions with trade variables vs agriculture variables in predicting the brightness of pixels has the three problems outlined.
But it also does not rule out non-dichotomous explanations - such as one by Bairoch (1988) who argued agriculture affects
trade in fostering urbanization or Smith (1776) who argued “without the assistance of some artificers, indeed, the cultivation
of land cannot be carried on but with great inconveniency and continual interruption.”
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else), in support of Hypothesis 2. I formalize this result by calculating the number of sessions that had
the same maximum population cell at the end of period 32 and period 16. More than half of the sessions
(13/24) had the same maximum population location, over half of which (7/24) were not at the central
cell. These proportions are far larger than the proportion predicted by pure chance that any of the 15
cells would be selected as the “place” twice, ∑15(1/15)2. I perform a regression analysis to formalize
other findings, but these calculations and Figure 3 provide sufficient support for the following
Finding 1: Central marketplaces often emerge.
Finding 2: Central marketplaces often reemerge at the same location after shocks.
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Figure 3: Evolution of Population Concentration
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4.2 Regression Analysis
I measure population concentration using a Hirschman Herfindahl Index at the grid level; HHI =∑`(n`)2
where n` is the share of the population in cell `. I then test my hypotheses with two OLS regressions of
E[HHIg,t ] = α +βThree Goodsg,t where the unit of observation is grid g at time period t. As in Panel
A of Figure 3, I restrict the data to the last 4 periods of each time block for each session. The first
regression also includes session fixed effects, while the second includes fixed effects for whether it was
the first or second time blocks and other covariates. Table 4 shows the results of those regressions, which
is followed by discussion.
Table 4: Population Concentration
HHI
(1) (2)
Three Goods 0.181∗∗∗ 0.256∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.049)
Not Land-Tied 0.381∗∗∗
(0.074)
Three Goods x Not Land-Tied −0.149∗
(0.074)
F.E. Session TimeBlock
Observations 192 192
R2 0.731 0.444
Notes: Unit of observation is a grid g at time t for each session over each of last 4 periods in a
time block. Dependant variable is population concentration as measured by HHI. Standard errors are
clustered on Session ID and (* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001).
The first column looks within sessions over time periods, and shows a positive coefficient for ‘Three
Goods’. This means that a population becomes more spatially concentrated when that economy has
more variety. The second column looks across sessions within a time period and shows the coefficient
for ‘Three Goods’ remains positive before and after adding the interaction term from ‘Three Goods x
Not Land-Tied’ (statistically different from 0 with p < 10% under a Wald chi-square test). This means
that economies with more variety are more concentrated regardless of whether they are land-tied, and
thus supports the strong version of Hypothesis 3. The second column also shows a positive coefficient
for ‘Not Land Tied’ which means economies that are not land-tied have more concentrated populations,
supporting Hypothesis 4. A negative interaction effect is also shown, which the theory made no predic-
tions about. This means the effect of variety is smaller in economies that are not land-tied. While the
standard errors are larger for the interaction effect, a visual inspection of population per populated cell
(Panel A, Figure 3) also supports this relationship and further suggests that being land-tied impedes the
initial formation of central marketplaces in economies with fewer goods. As a whole, these data support
the following findings
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Finding 3: Central marketplaces are more likely to emerge with a larger variety of goods in the economy.
Finding 4: Central marketplaces are less likely to emerge when individuals are land tied.
Finding 5: Being land-tied magnifies the effect of variety on agglomeration.
While Table 4 follows much of the empirical work by using an aggregate index or level, I also exploit
the non aggregated data to measure agglomeration as a dynamic spatial process. Specifically, I estimate
a diffusion coefficient in Appendix Section A.4. These results provide a complementary interpretation
of Findings 2 and 3; sessions with that were land-tied or had 2 goods were more diffusive than sessions
had 3 goods or were not land-tied. Both the HHI and diffusion results are consistent with the cost-
benefit analysis in the theory: when the gains from trade are higher or the costs of trading are lower,
agglomeration is more common.
4.3 Zipf Distributed Aggregates
Economic geographers have long been fascinated by, and providing explanations for, the linear relation-
ship between the log(size) and the log(rank(size)) of cities, in particular with a slope close to 1 (Auerbach
1913; Henderson 1974; Gabaix 1999; Eeckhout 2004; Dittmar 2011; Gabaix 2016). Many have also the-
orized about general underlying mechanisms for such linear rank-size relationships - i.e. birth/death
dynamics (Simon 1955) and divisions into groups (Adamic 2011). Those theories cannot explain why I
find that statistical rank-size relationship in my experiment. Figure 4 shows that summing all individuals
over all time periods for each location generates a Zipf distributed population.14
Figure 4: Zipf Distributed Aggregations
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This is an important finding because my experimental results match both the historical descriptions of
cities emerging from trade as well as the statistical description of cities. Since the location choices in my
experiment are based purely on the gains from trade, the data support the following finding
Finding 6: The aggregate distribution of individual location choices to trade is approximately Zipf.
14Appendix Section A.6 provides more statistical details about why the sum of heterogeneous location choices creates a
fat-tailed population distribution.
15
4.4 Choices of Goods
There is also an important distinction between micro and macro patterns of the goods chosen by indi-
viduals. Table 5 shows the average amounts of each good brought each individual in the treatment. The
last column shows the average number of periods each individual changed which good they brought, out
of the 16 periods. These results show that individuals anti-coordinated their goods on average, but were
frequently switching who brought which ones.
Table 5: Individual Good Choices
Quantity Quantity Quantity #Switches
Not Land-Tied 2 Goods 10.9 10.9 5.8
Land-Tied 2 Goods 8.8 8.7 5.1
Not Land-Tied 3 Goods 11.1 11.0 11.0 8.6
Land-Tied 3 Goods 8.3 8.3 8.4 8.0
The model predicted that the strategic uncertainty at the individual level should incentivize a central mar-
ketplace being selected. The reason is because central marketplaces are resilient to large deviations from
equilibrium behaviour. So the first finding that central marketplaces often emerge is in part explained by
the following finding.
Finding 7: Choices of goods were individually chaotic but still anti-coordinated on average.
Although individual payoffs increase from anti-coordination on goods, it was a very difficult problem for
individuals to figure out exactly who should bring what. Thaler, Sunstein, and Balz (2012) are right that
“Humans make mistakes. A well designed system expects its users to err and is as forgiving as possible.”
Those groups that endogenously formed central marketplaces were able to take advantage of the average
anti-coordination and reaped the gains from trade.
4.5 Welfare and Normative Outlook
Many scholars argue decentralized individuals fail to coordinate on desireable equilibria (Van Huyck,
Battalio, and Beil 1990; Ochs 1990; Cooper 1999) or that agglomerations suffer from some type of
market failure (Quinzii and Thisse 1990; Fujita and Thisse 2013b; Behrens and Robert-Nicoud 2015;
Gaubert 2018) - coordination failure in particular. My theoretical calculations in Section 2.3 also suggest
central marketplaces are not optimal. However, the large number of equilibria and the even larger number
of states of the world suggests finding a better state is a more appropriate criterion for success than a
theoretically ideal equilibrium.15 Along these lines, I compare the payoffs actually acheived to both the
maximum equilibrium-payoff in the long-run (what I specify as 0 transportation costs) and a random-
walk counterfactual. The long run payoff is 36 in the 3 good economy, and 24 for the 2 good economy.
The simulated random walk yeilds an average payoff of about 10 for either 2 or 3 good economies.16
15Cassady (1974) states “as time went on, regularly scheduled congregations of would be traders at some central point
came into existence. There were obviously inherent advantages in the regular gathering of those wishing to trade, rather than
relying haphazardly attempting to find one another in order to effect an exchange of goods”.
16The random walk was performed for each treatment. There were 100 simulation, each for 32 periods, where each
individuals location in the next period is a multinoulli random variable with step-wise probability for locations that cost less
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Figure 5 shows a time series of average individual payoffs, as well as both counterfactuals as thin dotted
lines.
Figure 5: Payoffs Over Time
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Only when individuals are not land-tied do they get close to the long run maximum, but payoffs are
higher than the random-walk counterfactual in all cases (and much higher in some cases). However, it
is problematic that these theoretical calculations depend heavily on the model parameters, as different
theoretical ideal points could be constructed which could paint very different pictures. So I avoid this
counterfactual-counterfactual problem and compare the payoffs actually observed when central market-
places were and were not formed. Table 5 shows that individuals changed goods frequently and Figure 3
shows that sessions without central marketplaces were scattered irregularly. Thus these data suggest that
sessions without central marketplaces were not coordinated at all in comparson to those with market-
places. I then perform a regression analysis that compares locations within and across sessions. Those
regressions show that locations with larger numbers of traders (over all periods) had higher average pay-
offs. So although sessions which formed central marketplaces did not reach theoretical maximim utility,
they did perform much better than sessions which did not.17 This evidence supports the following finding
Finding 8: Marketplaces emerge as a spatial-coordination device which improves the welfare of traders.
Marketplaces bring people together who have certain goods, and want certain others, at the right place
and time. In a world with a complex strategy space and a vast number of non-coordinating possibilities
this is a market-success not a market-failure. This normative outlook is important because the gains from
simplifying and stabilizing the exchange process are not included in any standard welfare calculation and
the economist is generally uncertain about a models’ parameters or even which games are being played.
So whether or not “our cities become uneconomically large” (Hotelling 1929) depends on whether it is
competition or coordination that brings us together, amongst other things.18
than 6 endowment units and 0 probability elsewhere.
17Moreover, if there are behavioral constraints or environmental uncertainties, then the central marketplace might actually
be the best we can hope for.
18In my experiment, individuals with the same good have choosen the same location for reasons that have nothing to
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5 Conclusion
I further the historical narrative of marketplaces with the modern microeconomic toolkit. Specifically, I
develop a pure-exchange location-coordination game that isolates the effects of economic variety and
land-tied residences. Although there are multiple equilibria, the model predicts evolutionary forces
should lead traders to agglomerate. I then test the model in a controlled virtual environment. Repeat
observations show that marketplaces emerge for dispersed traders to agglomerate and exchange, and
with greater tendency with a larger variety of goods. I argue that marketplaces spatially coordinate trade,
which helps Robinson, Crusoe, and many others to self-organize into markets and cities. Overall, I argue
that such Smithian Agglomeration is an important component of economic geography.
Taken together, this game and experiment provide a starting point for further research on isolating the
different agglomeration mechanisms. While this experiment focussed on one causal chain, much future
work remains. In particular, it remains to incorporate the reverse direction of causality (such as the role of
agglomerations in encouraging specialization), to integrate different mechanisms (such as city defenses),
to compare the magnitudes of different forces (such as spatial competition vs. spatial coordination),
and to expand to larger and more general settings (such as exchange and agglomeration at nodes in an
internet web). The microeconomics of spatially coordinated trade helps shed new light on marketplaces
and cities. For example, helping to answer open questions by Roth (2018, address to the A.E.A.) about
the role marketplaces in markets and which forces encourage or inhibit them. And the experimental
method is an exciting frontier to isolate and test the formation mechanisms.
do with spatial-competition. Spatial-coordination, where producers and consumers co-locate where they expect to find each
other, could plausibly be confounded with spatial-competition in other settings.
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A Appendix
A.1 Historical Narratives of Smithian Agglomeration
Many archeologists describe an important role of trade in early urban formations. For prehistory, see
(Ibáñez et al. 2018; Bakker et al. 2018; Wendling 2013; Kenoyer, Price, and Burton 2013; Parkin-
son, Nakassis, and Galaty 2013; Parker 2012; Mannion 2011; McIntosh 2011; McGeough 2011; Kha-
lidi 2010; Earle and Kristiansen 2010; Dillian and White 2009; Michailidou and Dogan 2008; Algaze
2009; Mark 1998; Kenoyer 1997). For ancient history see (Morris 1992; Andersen 1997; Schallin 1997;
Parkins and Smith 1998; Boardman 1999; Creekmore and Fisher 2014; Barjamovic et al. 2017). There
is even some fragmentary literary evidence on the role of marketplaces, such as the epic of Gilgamesh
noting people collecting at the marketplace of Uruk and the word ‘agora’ (described in Oeconomicus)
translating to both ‘gathering place’ and ‘marketplace’.
There is better evidence for the role of trade in early medieval cities. For example, Berlin, Cologne,
Hamburg, Bruges, Bergen all rose with Hanseatic trade, and Amsterdam, Lisbon, Seville, and London
with transatlantic trade. Many historic towns and city-centers in Europe contain or directly translate
to ‘Market’ or ‘marketplace’ (i.e. Nordic Kaupang) and some cities were founded for trade (i.e. Viking
Dublin). Paris evolved into a great city alongside numerous markets and fairs, with ancient origins where
the Parissi tribes coalesced at intersecting rivers Marne, Seine and Oise (Fierro 1998). But similar narra-
tives are told outside of Europe, and some even describe early populations concentrating at marketplaces
(Hodder 1965; Kheirabadi 1991; Romano 2015). Caillié (1824) documents in his landmark expedition
that “Timbuctoo, though one of the largest cities I have seen in Africa, possesses no other resource but its
trade” and Mattingly and Sterry (2013) argued trade was responsible for initial town formation. Glaeser
(2005) argues trade played the crucial role in the historical development of New York.
A.2 Extensive-Marginal Utility for CES Preferences
To formalize the extensive margins for CES preferences, drop transport-costs and note
∆(n,ρ) =
U2i (n)−U2i (n−1)
U2i (n)
=

∑ng=1
(
Ωg(n)
Ωi(n)
)ρ
∑n−1g=1
(
Ωg(n−1)
Ωi(n−1)
)ρ

1−ρ
ρ
−1
Assume that adding the new good does not change the ratios of equilibrium consumption;Ωg(n)/Ωi(n)=
Ωg(n−1)/Ωi(n−1). Then(
Ωn(n)
Ωi(n)
)ρ
+
n−1
∑
g=1
(
Ωg(n)
Ωi(n)
)ρ
>
n−1
∑
g=1
(
Ωg(n−1)
Ωi(n−1)
)ρ
Then dividing by the right hand side implies ∆(n,ρ) > 0. Also see that the strength of the incentive
depends on ρ; ρ → 1(perfect substitutes)⇒ ∆(n,ρ)→ 0. Note that the CES function amplifies the
effect of ρ since all goods are substitutes or complements to the new good by an equal degree. Also note
that adding transportation costs modify the incentives to agglomerate by altering endowment ratios in a
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generally uncertain way, and by reducing one’s endowment which disincentivizes agglomeration.
A.3 Data Summary
A.3.1 Land-Tied Location Choices
Figure 6a shows a time-series of 6 population heatmaps for each treatment (2 or 3 goods). Each map
corresponds to a session, showing the average number of individuals at each location over the previous
4 periods, with larger populations having darker colors. For example, the ‘Period 4’ bi-panel of maps
shows the six sessions that each have 3 goods are shown on the left in two columns and three rows.
The session on the top left of that panel has an average (over periods 1− 4) of about 2 individuals
at the cell in the 1st-row 3rd-column, 2 individuals at the cell in the 2nd-row 2nd-column, and less
than that at other locations. In the bi-panel for ‘Period 8’, that session is shown in the same relative
position, now averaging about 3 individuals at the cell in the 1st-row 4th-column and 3 individuals in
the 3rd-row 1st-column. Figure 6b shows the time-series of population maps after the locations were
reset and the number of goods were changed. Note that these maps avoid the cell-size issues of satelite
images, such as latitude/longitude projections which introduce a systematic bias by counting up people
in heterogeneously sized cells.
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Figure 6: Number of Players per Cell (4 Period Averages), Land Tied
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A.3.2 Not Land-Tied Location Choices
To test the effect of being Land-Tied, I let an individuals’ home relocate with their location choices.
Figure 7 shows how the location choices evolve, under both two and three good treatments, when indi-
viduals are not land-tied. There was a strong tendency for the initially dispersed population coalesces to
a single point over time, even in two-good treatments.
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Figure 7: Number of Players per Cell (4 Period Averages), Not Land Tied
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A.4 Agglomeration as a Dynamic Spatial Process
The diffusion coefficient differs from concentration indices by fully accounting for the spatial configu-
ration, i.e. distinguishing bi-modal population-distributions that are close and far apart, and also differs
from counts or densities which measure levels not changes over space and time. In words, the popu-
lation in a cell this period is equals to the population there last period plus the net amount gained in
the X-direction and Y-direction from last period. Specifically, I estimate the following first-order finite-
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difference approximation of the diffusion equation
N(x,y, t)−N(x,y, t−1) = K
[
[N(x−∆x,y, t−1)−N(x,y, t−1)]− [N(x,y, t−1)−N(x+∆x,y, t−1)]
+[N(x,y−∆y, t−1)−N(x,y, t−1)]− [N(x,y, t−1)−N(x,y+∆y, t−1)]
]
where N(x,y, t) is the population level at (x,y, t), N(x−∆x,y, t) is the population level in the cell to
the left, and K is the coefficient of diffusion. While differencing over time and space will eliminate
some level-terms (such as fixed effects), any errors in this process could plausibly have spatiotemporal
autocorrelation. So I estimate K by treating each session-block as a single large observation. Figure 8
groups each session-block by treatment, to show the distribution of coefficient estimates with the mean
estimate shown as a vertical red line. Comparing the session-blocks shows that sessions with that were
land-tied or had 2 goods were more diffusive.
Figure 8: Diffusion Coefficients
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A.5 Rank Size Distributions
The size distribution function entirely characterizes the relationship between size and rank. First, note
that the rank of any observation i corresponds to a quantile; quanti = 1− ranki/samp.size. Second, see
that size is associated with rank according to the quantile function; sizei =CDF−1(quanti) =CDF−1(1−
ranki/samp.size), or alternatively the survivor function; ranki = [1−CDF(sizei)](samp.size). Third, by
definition, a variable x has a fat-tailed distribution if 1−CDF(x) x→∞−−−→ x−α . So finally, a particular α = 1
fat-tail distribution approximately yields the Zipf relationship: ln(ranki) ≈ ln(samp.size)−αln(sizei).
Note that many non-negative distributins (i.e. those for sizes and counts) have a lot of probability mass
in the right tail that could yield the approximate relationship.
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A.6 Zipf Derivation
Figure 4 shows the population aggregates follow a zipf distribution. Figure 9 shows a summary of
each individuals frequency of choosing locations from most common, second-most common, ... to least
common. I now show why Figure 9 leads to Figure 4.
Figure 9: Individual Relative Location Choices
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Assume individual i choose location k with probability σ ki ; then `i ∼ Multinoulli(σi) Assume that
all individuals have the same location ordering, with individual heterogeneity only in the probability
magnitudes (i.e. as suggested in Figure 9). This means σi = σ is randomly distributed, and the location-
sum of I people is a multinomial mixture distribution;
s =∑`i ∼Multinomial(I,σ)
Note the expected population sums are s¯= E[s|σ , I] = Iσ , with the expected population size of a particu-
lar location sk ∈ s corresponding to the probability σ k ∈ σ . Now assume that the distribution of expected
sums conditioned on σ are approximately exponential; F(sk|λ ) = 1− exp(−λ sk). Also assume that
individual heterogeneity approximately takes the form λ ∼ exp(θ). Then substituting these exponential
mixture weights into the survivor function,
∫ ∞
0 [1−F(sk|λ )] f (λ )dλ , implies that
1−F(sk) =
(
1+
sk
θ
)−1
For details on how the survivor function determines the rank-size relationship, see Appendix Section A.5.
But this result means sk ∼ Loglog(θ ,1), which is a fat-tailed distribution. In particular, since the lim (1+
sk/θ)−1− (sk)−1 = 0 as sk → ∞, the expected population size distribution converges to a Pareto(1)
distribution. In line with empirical evidence, this limiting approximation also predicts population-counts
are more likely to appear zipf when examining datasets with truncated populations.
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B Experiment Instruction and Interface
1 Introduction
This is an experiment on economic decision-making. If you read the instructions carefully and make
good decisions, you can earn a considerable amount of money, which will be paid to you in CASH at
the end of the experiment. Experimental decisions will involve Experimental Currency Units (ECU) and
will be converted to dollars at a rate of 4ECU = $1 at the end of the experiment.
During the experiment you are not allowed to communicate with any other participant. You must also
put away all materials unrelated to the experiment, including cell-phones, tablets, and pen-and-paper. If
you do not follow these instructions you will be excluded from the experiment and paid only the show-up
payment of $7.
Before beginning the experiment, we will read through these instructions. Alongside the reading, we
will do a tutorial showing you how the interface works. When these instructions say On my command,
then wait for me to tell you what to do.
If you have any questions during the tutorial, quietly raise your hand, and I will call on you. If you have
any questions during the experiment, quietly raise your hand, and I will answer them privately.
On my command, click “Initialize”.
2 GamePlay Tutorial
You have been given 12 units of either , , or and are located at on the map. You should see your
default endowment on the top left of the screen.
Your task is to decide where to locate. There are benefits from trade if people with different goods meet
at the same location, but there are costs of moving locations. Note that every person will make these
decisions simultaneously, so noone will know what any other person’s decisions will be when making
their own. Also note that not all goods will be available during some periods.
2.1 Location Choice
In each period of the experiment, you will click on a location on the map to move to. Every location has
an x and y coordinate. You should see your default location somewhere on the Location Choice Map.
Every cell that you move away from will cost you units of your endowment.
On my command, click somewhere else on the map one time.
Your total transportation costs to get there are shown below the X .
On my command, click your home location.
Your total transportation costs to get there are shown below the X .
It costs you nothing to stay at home.
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2.2 Endowment Choice
In each period of the experiment, each of you will also choose which good to be endowed with.
On my command, Click another good. On my command, Click your original good.
If you do not choose a different endowment, your endowment will be the same as last period.
2.3 Earnings
There are benefits to locating with others who can trade with you.
• If you and another player both choose the same location, and each player has the same good, then
there won’t be a trade and each will earn their endowment.
• If you and another player both choose the same location, and each player has a different good, then
a trade will occur and your earnings will be higher than your endowment.
There can be more than two players at the same location. In general, your earnings increase when others
bring more of a different good but not if they bring the same good as you.
On my command, click the “Earnings” tab.
You can see exactly what your earnings could be under different combinations by moving the sliders
around. These sliders represent the quantity of different goods that you and other traders bring to a loca-
tion.
On my command, put 9 units supplied of My Good, by Me.
• If you are endowed with , then this means you brought 9 .
• If you are endowed with , then this means you brought 9 .
• If you are endowed with , then this means you brought 9 .
On my command, put 0 units supplied of My Good, by Others
• If you are endowed with , then this means others brought 0 .
• If you are endowed with , then this means others brought 0 .
• If you are endowed with , then this means others brought 0 .
On my command, put 11 units supplied of Different Good #1, by Others
• If you are endowed with , then this means others brought either 11 or 11 .
• If you are endowed with , then this means others brought either 11 or 11 .
• If you are endowed with , then this means others brought either 11 or 11 .
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On my command, put 0 units supplied of Different Good #2, by Others
You can see your Earnings would be 19.
• If you bring 9 , then you earn 19 when noone else brings and
other people bring either 11 or 11
• If you bring 9 , then you earn 19 when noone else brings and
other people bring either 11 or 11
• If you bring 9 , then you earn 19 when noone else brings and
other people bring either 11 or 11
On my command, Now put 10 units supplied of Different Good #2, by Others
You can see your Earnings would be 28.
• If you bring 9 , then you earn 28 when noone else brings and
other people bring either (11 and 10 ) or (10 and 11 )
• If you bring 9 , then you earn 28 when noone else brings and
other people bring either (11 and 10 ) or (10 and 11 )
• If you bring 9 , then you earn 28 when noone else brings and
other people bring either (11 and 10 ) or (10 and 11 )
On my command, increase the quantity supplied of My Good, By Others. See that this decreases your
payoffs. Note that since there are only 5 other players, each with 12 units, the sum-total of all goods
provided by others must be less than 60. If you try to simulate more than that, you will get an error
message.
Everyone take two minutes to play around with the sliders and understand your payoffs.
Are there any questions about how the simulator works?
Beside these sliders are a table. This table shows your previous location choices, the good you supplied,
your earnings, and the period.
2.4 History
On my command, click the “History” tab.
There are 3 maps, each pertaining to a particular good, show a summary of everyones choices last period.
Focus on the map of .
Each location on this history map corresponds to a location on the location choice map. At each location,
“Quant” shows the total quantity of brought by all players to that cell in the last period. Since this
is the first period, there is no history, and all quantities are 0. That will change as the game progresses;
cells with more in the last period will be colored darker blue.
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Also shown at each location are the average earnings of players who had . So if one player brought 9
(3 units lost) and earned 38, and another brought 12 (0 units lost) and earned 50, then “Earn” would
show (50+38)/2 = 44.
The maps for and are read the same way. Are there any questions about how to read the maps?
2.5 Period Timing
Each period is timed, and lasts a total of 60 seconds. The amount of time left in the period is shown in
the top right of the screen, and will update every 10 seconds.
You will have 55 seconds to make your choices. When the timer is up, you are moved to your chosen
location. The computer will then exchange goods amongst all of the players at that location, and will
calculate your earnings based on how much of each good everyone brought. These calculations are the
same that are shown by the simulator. You will then see a pop-up for 5 seconds that summarizes your
choices and your earnings. Your home will be moved the location you chose last period, you will get
another 12 units, and the next period will begin.
Note that you can lock in your choices at any point before the timer is up by clicking the ‘submit‘ button.
If you don’t click submit, then your location choice will be the last location clicked before the timer is
up. If you do not click any locations, you will stay at your home location. Are there any questions about
how the game will progress?
3 Game Conclusion and Payment
At the end of this experiment, a short post-game survey and a summary of your experiment payout will
come up. Your in-game payment was calculated by randomly choosing your earnings from one period
before a pause and one period after a pause and converting them from ECU to $. Your in-game payment
is then added to your showup payment of $7. Once you have submitted the survey, please remove your
hands from the mice/keyboard and wait quietly. You will then soon be called up individually to receive
your payment.
4 Practice Round
There will now be a live practice period where you can explore the interface on your own. Note that
neither this period nor the tutorial can be chosen for payment. When this practice period is finished,
please wait for further instruction.
On my command, make a location choice and click “Submit” to end the turial period and begin the
practice round.
4
32
Fi
gu
re
B
.1
:U
se
rI
nt
er
fa
ce
33
